Liberal Perfectionism by Alexandra Couto

Author:Alexandra Couto [Couto, Alexandra]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: De Gruyter
Published: 2014-07-16T00:00:00+00:00

5 The Consistency Argument

5.1 Introduction

The argument I will consider in this chapter claims that the current commitment of the liberal state to the protection of individual rights, is inconsistent with refraining from promoting the interests protected by these rights. By arguing that the liberal state is guilty of inconsistency, this argument has several advantages over the previous arguments. First, it is less abstract: the arguments we considered so far operated at a pre-political level which ignored the concrete commitments of the liberal state. Second, the Consistency Argument can address a wider audience, as it does not rely on a specific conception of authority. Finally, by rejecting the consistency of the liberal state position, the Consistency Argument allows us to shift the burden of proof towards the neutralist liberal. The Consistency Argument claims that it is inconsistent for the liberal state to protect liberal rights, without being prima facie committed to the promotion of interests. Recall that, in chapter 1, I claimed that in order to argue for Political Perfectionism (i.e. the claim that the state is permitted and justified to protect and promote the opportunities for citizens to engage with intrinsically valuable goods) it was a pre-requisite to argue both in favour of Modest and Prima Facie Political Perfectionism. The Consistency Argument provides thus truly an argument in favour of Political Perfectionism, that is, it constitutes both a rejection of the claim that the state ought to be neutral and an affirmation of the claim that it is justified in protecting and promoting some goods on the basis of their intrinsic value.

I will start by looking at two existing arguments formulated by Vinit Haksar and Charles Taylor. Both claim that the actual commitment of the liberal state to the protection of individual rights has perfectionist implications. However, their arguments will be rejected as they are both committed to the claim that the attribution of rights stem out of some essential features displayed by the right-holders. As I argued in chapter 2 (section 6), any attempt to ground rights on essential properties of human beings is unlikely to succeed. Then, I will discuss some of the implications that holding or rejecting this essentialist picture could have on whether animals have rights.

I will then formulate a positive argument inspired by their arguments in favour of Political Perfectionism. This argument, the Consistency Argument, will argue that certain commitments of the liberal state entail some perfectionist commitments. Even if they do not necessarily formulate this exactly in these terms, neutralist liberals are committed to hold the view that, if one holds x to be valuable, the protection of x is required, but not its promotion. They are committed to such a view, when they claim for instance that it is warranted to protect the right to education, but that there is no duty to promote various educational projects targeting adults more widely. Or, when they claim that, although there is a right to free speech, the state is justified in stopping there and is

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